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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal Federalism and Risk Sharing in Germany: the Role of Size Differences 
by Kai A. Konrad and Helmut Seitz* 
We study the effect of size differences for an optimal risk sharing system of 
intergovernmental transfers in Germany. The German fiscal transfer system should 
account for the fact that an optimal insurance mechanism  has the property that smaller 
states contribute a smaller share of their tax revenue to the redistribution mechanism. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal federalism, risk sharing, size asymmetry 
JEL classification: D70, H41, H77 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Risikokonsolidierung im Rahmen des deutschen Länderfinanzausgleichs: die Rolle 
von Größenunterschieden 
Wir betrachten die Rolle von Größenunterschieden von Gebietskörperschaften für einen 
optimalen Risikoausgleich im Rahmen eines föderalen Finanzausgleichs in Deutsch-
land. Zunächst wird der Spielraum für einen möglichen Risikoausgleich durch 
interregionale Ausgleichszahlungen zwischen Gebietskörperschaften in Deutschland 
analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass unsystematische Risiken insbesondere aus längerfristigen 
Entwicklungsunterschieden bestehen. Für das optimale Transfersystem sollte angesichts 
möglicher Anreizwirkungen solcher Systeme gelten, dass homogene Gebietskörper-
schaften einen um so größeren Anteil ihres Steueraufkommens in das interregionale 
Transfersystem einbringen sollten, je größer sie sind. 
                                                 
*  We thank Helmut Bester, participants of the Microeconomic Theory Workshop at the Free University 
at Berlin, of the conference on Public Finances and Public Policy in the New Millenium at CES, and of 
the Public Economics Seminar at CORE and three referees for many valuable comments. The usual 
caveat applies. 
1 Introduction
The literature on fiscal federalism has extensively discussed federal transfer
systems. As Musgrave (1961) has pointed out in the introduction to his sem-
inal paper on Approaches to A Fiscal Theory of Political Federalism, there
are many possible reasons why the central government in a federation may
interfere with state finances. The complexity of actual transfer arrangements
reflects the multiplicity of reasons for such transfers.1 Musgrave (1961) distin-
guishes several objectives. First, the central government may try to influence
the amount or type of public services, or the terms on which public services
are provided at the state level. Second, the federal government may try to
make a citizen’s situation in terms of public services more independent of the
state to which the citizen belongs to. All these objectives may be at work in
the German case, where not only are state and federal revenues redistributed
according to a complex scheme, but the provision of public services by states
and by the federal government is also highly integrated. Very recently the
German Supreme Court has demanded a major reform of this system.
A central aspect that provides legitimation for a system of unconditional
transfers between states in a federation2 is idiosyncratic regional risk and
the potential for intergovernmental risk sharing. We will concentrate on this
aspect here. The potential for risk sharing in federations is a hotly debated
issue. Of course, like any risk sharing device, risk sharing between regions
involves some problems of moral hazard.3 Mutual insurance among states
against random variations in the provision of public services would be pro-
vided by ex-post equalization of actual outlays or performance. As Musgrave
(1961) pointed out when discussing equalization of actual outlays or perfor-
1Sometimes this is a scheme in which regions redistribute some share in their gov-
ernment budgets among themselves. Sometimes the redistribution occurs via regional
contributions to a federal layer of government, or via the way the federal government al-
locates revenues that stem from all regions for purposes that benefit some regions more
than others, or both. Transfer systems become even less transparent through matching
grants provisions and other joint funding of regional expenditure. Also, there seems to be
a tendency for the complexities of these transfer mechanisms grow over time. Hence, it
may be not an accident that the German system is particularly complex, as it has been in
place now for 50 years. Another example is the EU budget, particularly the complication
that is introduced by the special provisions for the U.K. and the way these have developed
from one reform to the next (see, e.g., Messal and Klein, 1993).
2As has been discussed in the literature on fiscal federalism, conditional transfers or
matching grants play a major role in internalizing interregional spillovers. See, for example,
Oates (1972).
3There may also be issues of adverse selection, and several papers, e.g., by Cremer
and Pestieau (1997), Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001), Cornes and Silva (2000)
consider this aspect.
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mance, fiscal equalization systems that force regions with above average per
capita tax revenues to pay transfers to regions with below average fiscal ca-
pacity generate strong disincentives for tax revenue generating policies in
both fiscally weak and fiscally strong regions.
A large number of recent contributions has addressed the fundamental
trade-oﬀs between risk sharing, redistribution between regions that diﬀer
with respect to their expected wealth, and incentives.4 This paper revisits
the fundamental trade-oﬀ between risk sharing and incentives for local gov-
ernments. Much of the literature has focused on federal transfers as a risk
sharing device to smooth private consumption (see, e.g., Fatás (1998) and
Forni and Reichlin (1999) for two views and brief surveys on the empirical
literature). We concentrate on risk sharing of government revenues, and leave
private sector risks aside. This choice is made for two reasons. First, we can
expect that global private capital markets can take care of risks in the private
sector much better than any smoothing via countercyclical taxation and the
insurance eﬀect of tax transfers within a federation, because it encompasses
a larger set of risky assets that involve idiosyncratic risks.5 This argument
is stronger the smaller the federation under consideration, and hence par-
ticularly relevant for a federation such as Germany that represents only a
small share in global economic activity. Second, it is known that government
revenue is more volatile than aggregate income itself. Hence, governments’
revenue risks are of particular relevance.
The central aspect we address is asymmetry in regions’ population size.
All existing federations are composed of regions of asymmetric population
size. Diﬀerences in size within Germany are almost as dramatic as in the
EU6. For instance, the largest state in 1999, North Rhine-Westphalia, had
18m inhabitants which is 27.1 times the size of the population of Bremen, the
smallest state in terms of population size, which had a population of 0.66m.
The second-largest state, Bavaria, had 12.1m inhabitants, which is 11.4 times
the size of the second smallest state, Saarland, which had a population of
1.07m. Suppose two states form a federation, one state A about ten times
the size of the other state B. Neglecting the issue of moral hazard, the best
4See, for instance, contributions by Bucovetsky (1997, 1998), Lee (1998), Alesina and
Perotti (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (1996a, 1996b) and Lockwood (1999).
5For instance, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) estimated that in the US in the
period from 1964 to 1990 private capital markets and credit markets account for 39 and
23 percent of total consumption smoothing, respectively, compared to a contribution of 13
percent by the federal fiscal transfer system.
6In the European Union, the largest country (Germany) has about 200 times the popu-
lation size of the smallest country (Luxembourg), and the second-largest country (France)
has more than 16 times the size of the second-smallest country (Ireland).
3
mutual insurance outcome would be obtained if both states collect their risky
tax revenue, sum up their tax revenues and divide this total sum between
them (not necessarily evenly). However, moral hazard incentives on the side
of states would typically make this maximum mutual insurance suboptimal.
With revenue sharing, each state’s incentive to enforce the (uniform federal)
tax laws and to spend money on tax auditing is diminished. In this paper
we consider linear mutual insurance schemes. We characterize the optimal
linear mutual insurance scheme.7 We show that the per capita share of a
region’s tax revenue that should enter the insurance scheme is higher the
larger the relative size of this region. Further, even though the optimal
insurance scheme has larger contributions by larger regions, which increases
their moral hazard incentives, it holds that, for optimal contribution shares,
the larger region chooses higher per capita tax revenue than the smaller
region.
In what follows we first briefly survey the empirical literature on risk shar-
ing in federations, consider whether there is scope for risk sharing within a
federation such as Germany (which could possibly justify some of the federal
transfer mechanism that exists under the current law), and survey the incen-
tive properties of the current system of federal transfers in Section 2. Then
we establish the main results regarding the impact of relative size on the
optimal mutual insurance contract within a federation in Section 3 and draw
conclusions for the optimal design of the federal transfer system.8 Section 4
summarizes the findings and concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
To assess the importance of size eﬀects in the trade-oﬀ between risk sharing
and the disincentive eﬀects of mutual insurance arrangements in a federal
system of taxes and transfers as in Germany, we consider two types of evi-
dence. We consider the scope for risk diversification in federations, and we
consider how size aﬀects the incentive eﬀects of a proportional redistribution
mechanism.
Whether region specific (idiosyncratic) economic performance risk in fed-
erations is of major importance, and whether federal tax-transfer systems can
7Existing federations are more likely to be a political economy outcome than the out-
come of a welfare maximization calculus. However, the eﬃcient allocation is of some
interest as a benchmark case. One may then ask why actual political outcomes deviate
from this eﬃcient outcome.
8Our aim is not to draw conclusions about whether existing federal transfer mechanisms
redistribute too much or too little. Instead, we derive an optimality property by which
regions’ contribution shares should be diﬀerentiated according to relative size.
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provide a quantitatively important amount of insurance is a debated issue.
The empirical literature mainly concentrates on the eﬀect of federal taxation
on consumption risk in the EU, the US, and Canada, and, for assessing the
scope for interstate insurance in Germany, we may follow the general insights
from this literature.
Fatás (1998), for instance, examined GDP growth rates across US states
from 1969 to 1990. He calculated standard deviations ranging from 10.36
(North Dakota) to as low as 1.64 (Pennsylvania) with an average of 2.17.
Standard deviations relative to the aggregate were between 6.53 (North
Dakota) and 0.96 (Pennsylvania), with an average of 1.36. Finally, corre-
lations of growth rates with the average growth rate (of all states in the fed-
eration, excluding the particular state under consideration) ranged between
0.13 (Wyoming) and 0.93 (Ohio) with an average of 0.72. Fatás (1998) also
compares these values with the EU countries. There, for the pre EMU period
from 1979 to 1996, the standard deviation of growth rates had an average of
1.71, the average of standard deviations relative to the aggregate was 1.41,
and the average correlation was 0.56. He then considers the consumption
smoothing that was generated by federal taxation. Consumption smoothing
via federal tax and transfer systems can be attributed to two eﬀects: interre-
gional smoothing (sharing of idiosyncratic variations of state tax bases) and
intertemporal smoothing (sharing fluctuations of the aggregate tax base over
time). Only the first eﬀect is the ”insurance eﬀect” of federal tax-transfer
systems. The second eﬀect is called ”substitution eﬀect”. Fatás argues that
the insurance eﬀect contributes most to explaining consumption smoothing
if there is no variation in growth rates in the aggregate over time, but much
variation in growth rates across regions within each period. Similarly, con-
sumption smoothing can mainly be attributed to intertemporal smoothing,
and not to an insurance eﬀect if growth rates across regions within periods
are highly correlated, and if there is considerable variation in the aggregate
growth rate over time. The insurance eﬀect contributes little to consump-
tion smoothing if the growth rates fluctuate much over time and are highly
correlated across states, and the insurance part of consumption smoothing is
large if there is little intertemporal variation in growth, but large variation
across states. For the US, Fatás concludes that federal taxation smoothes
consumption, but that 2/3 of this eﬀect should be attributed to intertempo-
ral tax smoothing, and only about 1/3 of the eﬀect should be attributed to
an insurance eﬀect.
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State σi σi/σ¯i Corr
N R-P 1.922 0.995 0.951
Bavaria 1.884 0.977 0.953
BW 2.331 1.263 0.934
L-Sax 1.901 0.880 0.890
Hesse 2.377 1.264 0.882
R-P 2.009 1.053 0.929
SH 1.932 0.993 0.625
Saarland 1.976 1.033 0.772
Hamburg 1.922 0.886 0.714
Bremen 1.905 0.740 0.780
average 2.073 1.073 0.933
Table 1. Volatility and correlation of real GDP growth rates 1971 - 1999 of
states in West Germany (excluding Berlin-West). σi denotes the standard devia-
tion of real GDP growth rate of state i. σ¯i denotes the standard deviation of real
GDP growth in West Germany (excluding state i). Corr denotes the correlation
coeﬃcient between the real GDP growth rate of state i and real GDP growth rate
in West Germany (excluding the state i). (Calculated from Volkswirtschaftliche
Gesamtrechnung der Länder.)
In the light of these results, the respective data on West Gemany in Table
1 draw a gloomy picture about the possible benefits of interregional insurance.
The average standard deviation in Germany is in the same range as in the US
or in Europe, but the correlation of states’ growth has been much larger in
Germany than in the US or across EU countries. Fatás’ (1998) verdict on the
role of insurance in consumption smoothing would therefore apply even more
strongly for Germany: the share of the ”insurance eﬀect” for consumption
smoothing in Germany would be very small.
Forni and Reichlin (1999) review the results that point to insurance ef-
fects being of little importance. They argue that autocorrelation of regional
growth can change these results: regions can take care of high frequency
changes in growth performance by intertemporal smoothing, particularly bor-
rowing and lending, and this is true for both the private and the public sec-
tors. Hence, the main purpose of insurance via federal taxation is to insure
against long lasting shocks, that is, states would like to insure their citi-
zens against long lasting changes in economic performance, relative to other
states.9
9Such insurance need not be desirable in a world with perfectly mobile citizens, because
it reduces migration and prevents individuals from making use of productivity diﬀerences.
However, mobility is rather imperfect. If we assume that the migration cost for the old
6
Indeed, in Germany there is some evidence that such long term changes
in regional prosperity do exist. For instance, as reported in Färber (1998,
p. 112), Bavaria had a much steeper growth path than all other states in
Germany. In 1950 per capita GDP in Bavaria was about 87 percent of average
per capita GDP in Germany and this ratio increased to about 108 percent in
1997. Similarly, Hesse moved from 99.3 percent in 1950 to 123.6 percent in
1997, whereas relative per capita income in North Rhine-Westphalia dropped
from 120.2 percent in 1950 to 93.9 percent in 1997. Hamburg shows a U-
shaped pattern, starting from 186.2 percent of average GDP per capita in
1950, dropping to 162.2 percent in 1990, and rising again to 176 percent
in 1997. Figure 1 depicts these changes for all West German states.10 For
the tax revenue, changes can be expected to be even more pronounced, as
the progressivity of many taxes lead to a more than proportional reaction
of tax revenue to changes in the tax base. Because government revenue is
strongly procyclical with GDP growth, any random shock on GDP growth
is magnified with respect to growth rates, and hence, this risk may be larger
than the variation in GDP.
This suggests that there is some long run variation in tax bases across
German states, leaving some scope for an insurance motive in the federal
tax-transfer system. Of course, we should note that there are some caveats.
The long term changes in performance are only partially the outcome of
exogenous developments. First, the federal system, in which considerable
interaction between states occurred both in terms of tax revenue sharing and
in terms of public service provision, may have had an impact on regional
growth and development. It is likely that this interaction had an equalizing
eﬀect, so that the variation in Figure 1 may understate the exogenous risks.
Second, regional growth and development depends on factors such as
regional investment, and other regional policy. Regional investment along
relevant dimensions (infrastructure, human capital) may have been higher in
the states that outperformed other states, or these states may simply have
had better government. However, there are also some seemingly exogenous
developments that can be seen as ’natural’ explanations for the most notable
changes that occurred in Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg
and Bremen. For instance, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg and Bremen
generation is prohibitive, but the young can migrate, the exodus of the young may actually
aggravate economic shocks. Migration cannot be expected to work as an instantaneous
buﬀer. Adjustment to permanent changes in productivity takes time, leaving a consider-
able role for insurance against long lasting shocks.
10The former Berlin (West) is not included in the empirical stocktaking because Berlin
(West) and Berlin (East) merged in 1990 to form the state Berlin and therefore consistent
time series data on Berlin are not available.
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Figure 1: Regional long term economic performance risks in Germany (data
source: Färber, 1998).
were ”rich” in the fifties, because the former state had a lot of mining and iron
and steel industries and the latter two had a lot of ship building industry. The
global crisis in recent decades in these industries had not been anticipated
in the fifties by most economists. Similarly, the tremendous importance of
fashion, media, communication, air transport, and the financial sector in the
nineties that contributed to the economic prosperity increase in Bavaria and
Hesse were also not anticipated by many economists in the fifties.
A second issue that has to be addressed is whether size diﬀerences be-
tween the German states really matter. Table 2 presents several measures.
Column 1 simply presents state population which indicates rather dramatic
diﬀerences in population size across states. Column 2 presents the population
share of the various states. With a per capita uniform transfer mechanism,
this relative size is a measure of how much returns to a state in terms of
transfers if the state raises its tax base by one additional Deutschmark, if
this Deutschmark fully enters into the transfer system. Column 3 reports
the implicit tax rate, ITR100, if all tax revenues are taken into account in the
fiscal equalization system. For comparison, column 4 reports the implicit tax
rate if only 90% of state tax revenues enter the fiscal equalization system,
ITR90. The final column, MTR, reports the implicit marginal tax rates for
the actual federal tax-transfer mechanism that operated in Germany, based
on 1996 data reported in Baretti et al. (2000). Simple eyeballing reveals
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that there is a close relationship between ITR90 and MTR. This is not an
accident. The German federal tax-transfer system is rather complex, and
consists of a number of steps involving both interstate equalization of tax
revenues and further equalizing transfers from the federal government to the
states.11 However, an important element is that a major share of VAT taxes
and federal transfers are used to equalize more broadly defined tax revenues
per capita (including revenues from income taxation and some others, but
not all state revenues), and we can expect that this eﬀect contributes to
making ITR90 and MTR rather similar.
States ni niP nj ITR100 ITR90 MTR
N R-W 18.000 0.219 0.781 0.703 0.712
Bavaria 12.155 0.148 0.852 0.767 0.745
BW 10.476 0.128 0.872 0.785 0.755
L-Sax. 7.899 0.096 0.904 0.814 0.851
Hesse 6.052 0.074 0.926 0.833 0.798
Saxony 4.460 0.054 0.946 0.851 0.898
R-P 4.031 0.049 0.951 0.856 0.872
S-A 2.649 0.032 0.968 0.871 0.909
S-H 2.777 0.034 0.966 0.869 0.878
Thur. 2.449 0.030 0.970 0.873 0.910
Brand. 2.601 0.032 0.968 0.871 0.910
M W-P 1.789 0.022 0.978 0.880 0.914
Saarland 1.072 0.013 0.987 0.888 0.919
Berl. 3.387 0.041 0.959 0.863 0.898
Hamburg 1.705 0.021 0.979 0.881 0.914
Bremen 0.663 0.008 0.992 0.893 0.916
Table 2. ni = Population in state i in 1999 (source: Statistisches Bundesamt),
ni/
P
nj = population in state i as a share of aggregate population, ITR100=
1 − ni/
P
nj is the implicit tax rate that results from a federal redistribution
system if all state tax revenues are summed up and shared evenly on a per capita
basis between all states. ITR90 = (0.9)(1 − ni/
P
nj) is the respective implicit
tax rate that results from a federal redistribution system if 90 percent of all state
tax revenue are summed up and shared evenly on a per capita basis.12 MTR is the
marginal tax rates on state tax revenue in Germany (the net outflow share from
11Another major element of interregional redistribution in Germany is social insurance.
As we consider government budgets, and these systems are organized independently and
are not part of the government budget in Germany, we disregard these types of redistrib-
ution.
12ITR100 and ITR90 correspond to γ = 1 and γ = 0.9 in the section 3 below.
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an increase in income tax revenue in state i by one million DEM) as reported in
Baretti et al. (2000, p. 106) on the basis of actual data in Germany for 1996.
Table 2 shows that size diﬀerences generate substantially diﬀerent mar-
ginal incentives for generating tax revenue for the diﬀerent German states.
States in Germany audit and enforce the tax laws. Most of these tax laws
are uniform throughout the federation. However, states have some discre-
tion as to how strictly they enforce tax laws, and how much they spend
on monitoring and auditing, and the implicit tax rates may influence these
decisions.13
Now we turn to the theoretical aspects of size diﬀerences in a mutual
insurance scheme between states in a federation.
3 Optimal insurance
Transfer schemes in federations are typically symmetric, in the sense that all
states in the federation participate with the same share in their government
revenues in the tax-transfer scheme. In this section, we will highlight that
this is suboptimal. The optimal tax-transfer mechanism should account for
relative size. We consider the role of population size for the optimal mutual
insurance contract in a simple framework.
Consider a federation that consists of two states, A and B. The states are
inhabited by nA and nB identical individuals, respectively, with N = nA+nB
being the total number of individuals. There is no information asymmetry
between individuals and the state government so that the governments be-
have in the best interest of their citizens.14 Simplifying as much as possible,
the utility of a citizen in region i is described by
ui = θEgi − βS(gi)− ϕ(ei) (1)
with gi the per capita amount of a publicly provided good in region i, Egi
is the expected amount of provision, S(gi) is the variance of this per capita
amount and β is the relative weight of variance in units of expected amount.
13Whether such disincentives exist or not is hotly debated in German politics, and essen-
tially this is an empirical question. Some results supporting the existence of disincentive
eﬀects are presented in Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau (1999). Given the importance of
this question, and the problems of measuring these eﬀects, this question is likely to trigger
more empirical work in the future.
14This assumption is for simplicity here, as we concentrate on a simple point which
would also emerge if we chose a political economy approach.
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The factor θ measures the marginal utility of a unit of expected public pro-
vision of goods in units of private income, and we assume θ > 1. The term
ϕ(ei) measures the cost of taxation and will be explained in detail below.
The per capita amounts of a publicly provided good are determined as
follows. The two governments’ tax collections per capita are eA and eB.
In addition to these amounts, they receive random per capita revenues εA
and εB. These random variables have mean zero and variance σ2. They are
perfectly correlated between citizens of the same state. They may or may not
be correlated across the two states, and the covariance is cov(εA, εB) ≡ ρ2.
We can think of εi as consisting of a state specific shock and a federation
wide shock, e.g., in terms of random variation of the statutory tax base, or of
random factors that determine the tax collection cost. Each state government
learns the value of its own state specific shock after their collection eﬀorts are
already chosen.15 Once ei and εi are determined, their sum (ei+ εi) becomes
publicly observable.
Consider now the term ϕ(ei). This term measures the individuals’ cost
of governmental revenue collection activity in units of private income. For
instance, this cost is the tax burden itself that reduces private consumption,
but also the excess burden that is caused by distortionary taxes, and the cost
of monitoring and enforcing the tax laws. In line with standard results on the
cost of taxation, this cost is assumed to be strictly convex, that is, ϕ0 > 0,
ϕ00 > 0. We also assume convex marginal cost, ϕ000 ≥ 0. This assumption
is mainly for analytical convenience. This assumption is well known from
standard moral hazard models (see Laﬀont and Tirole 1993).
Note that all regions are symmetric with respect to preferences of indi-
viduals, tax collection cost per capita, etc. We disregard, for instance, the
issue of wealth per capita diﬀerences in diﬀerent regions that have been the
focus of recent interest in the literature. The only asymmetry we consider is
that states diﬀer in population size.
There is a redistribution mechanism of tax revenues between the states
that provides mutual insurance. We denote (1−γi) the share of revenue that
remains with the state, and γi the share of region i’s tax revenue that enters
the mutual insurance mechanism. Then we obtain
gi = (1− γi)(ei + εi) +
X
k=A,B
γknk(ek + εk)
1
N
(2)
Hence, we assume that the payments that enter the redistribution mecha-
nism are distributed evenly over the total population. This is the case, for
15Accordingly, we consider a simple moral hazard problem. A diﬀerent time structure
in which a region learns about εi before it chooses its eﬀort ei would be interesting as well
and leads to some mechanism design issues.
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instance, if the state contributions go to a central government in the feder-
ation that redistributes it among the states on a per capita basis, or if the
same procedure is implemented by way of an agreement among the states.
We are interested in the optimal linear redistribution mechanism here, and
hence, the problem will be to determine the optimal γA and γB, and we will
compare our results then with the redistribution mechanism that is at work
in Germany.
Note that uniform γi = γ = 1 and γi = γ = 0.9 applied to population
sizes in Germany generates the implicit tax rates ITR100 and ITR90 in Table
2. Recall that the actual redistribution mechanism in Germany yields a
marginal tax burden on state tax revenue which is very closely approximated
by a constant γ of (0.9), the same for all states, and independent of population
size.16
It is also important to note that, with two states, the two variables γA and
γB span the whole set of linear mutual insurance contracts that are budget
balanced, except for a possible revenue independent transfer from one state
to the other. However, given that the payoﬀ functions as in (1) are linear in
expected government expenditure, for characterizing the optimal insurance
contract, the revenue independent transfer is irrelevant, and it is without loss
of generality if we set this transfer equal to zero.17
The per capita risks in state A become
S(gA) = (1−γA+γA
nA
N
)2σ2+(γB
nB
N
)2σ2+2(1−γA+γA
nA
N
)(γB
nB
N
)ρ2, (3)
and S(gB) is obtained from (3) by replacing all subscripts A by B and vice
versa.
It is important to note, however, that the point here is more general and
also applies if the federal government uses the contributions in a welfarist
way among the states, for instance, for the provision of a global public good
16As discussed previously, the assumption that states enforce federal tax laws approxi-
mates the German system, and tax law enforcement is more centralized in many federa-
tions. However, the principal result that requires taking size diﬀerences into consideration
is of more general validity and may also be applied to issues such as public goods spillovers,
or fiscal externalities.
17Note also that, due to possible non-zero correlation in outcomes, the optimal incentive
contract that determines the transfer that a region receives would be a function not only
of the region’s own revenues in absolute terms, but also of how the region performed
compared with the revenue that is obtained in the other region. In order to make use
of this type of yardstick competition, a residual claimant would be needed who receives
any budget surplus/deficit. However, if the redistribution mechanism has to be budget
balanced, any linear redistribution mechanism can be characterized simply by some γA
and γB.
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that is non-rival among all citizens, the amount of which is a function of
total contributions
P
k=A,B γknk(ek + εk), or for per capita contributions of
publicly provided private goods.
We can now consider the problem of constitutional design and ask for the
linear sharing rules (γA, γB) that maximize the sum of utilities
U = nAuA + nBuB (4)
in the two states, taking into account that redistributions cannot be made
contingent on states’ choices of ei, as these choices cannot be observed, due
to the random shock that adds to their actual tax collection eﬀorts.
We disregard several important issues here. First, we disregard a partici-
pation constraint for each state. This is not a major shortcoming. Given the
quasi linear payoﬀ functions, an ex ante participation constraint can always
be met by appropriate outcome independent transfer payments that are de-
termined at the constitutional stage and compensate the (large) states that
lose from participating in the optimal mechanism. Second, we do not allow
for endogenous formation of states. As small states have an advantage here,
there would be a tendency for states to split up into smaller units. In exist-
ing federations, typically there are major hurdles that make such structural
changes diﬃcult. Third, we disregard the most important questions of the
optimal size and structure of federations.18
The problem of finding the optimal sharing rules (γA, γB) resembles a
standard insurance problem with proportional insurance with moral hazard,
as in Shavell (1979). However, there are two important diﬀerences that make
this problem diﬀerent from a standard optimal insurance problem. First,
we consider mutual insurance among a small number of agents. There is no
risk neutral agent here, and also aggregate risk does not vanish. Second,
and more importantly, the agents here diﬀer in size in a non-trivial way: the
problem is diﬀerent from mutual insurance between two agents who diﬀer
in their wealth and in their wealth risks, because our ”agents” consist of
sets of individuals, and these sets diﬀer in the number of their elements. A
large region represents large aggregate income risk but also consists of a large
number of persons among which risks can be shared. The number of persons
matters particularly if this region shares in the risks from another region.19
18This problem has many dimensions. For instance, there could be an optimal degree
of centralization in enforcement of the tax laws. Further, idiosyncratic risk is needed
to make federations optimal from a risk sharing point of view, and population size, risk
preferences, and the size and correlation of state risks would be important determinants
for these design questions.
19As is known from the Arrow-Lind theorem, or portfolio theory, it makes a diﬀerence
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For any given values γA and γB, regions maximize the utility of their re-
spective citizens by a choice of ei, anticipating the other region’s equilibrium
choice and taking this choice as given. Straightforward calculations yield first
order conditions for choices of ei as
1− γi +
ni
N
γi =
ϕ0(ei)
θ (5)
for i = A,B. Eﬃcient tax collection would require ϕ0(ei) = θ. The first-
order conditions reveal that states choose ineﬃciently low tax collection if
they participate in the revenue sharing mechanism. A state chooses a higher
tax revenue ei if the share γi of revenue that goes into the redistribution
mechanism is small, and if the relative size of the state compared to the
total population in the federation is large. In particular, if contribution
shares γi are uniform across states, in expectation large states generate more
revenue per capita than small states do, and we would expect that there is
net redistribution from large to small states.
Here we are interested in the normative question of optimal contribution
shares. From (5) and maximization of (4) we obtain a system of equations
that characterizes the second best optimal sharing rules as follows:"
(2βσ2 + θ2nB
Nϕ00(eA)) −2βρ
2
−2βρ2 (2βσ2 + θ2nA
Nϕ00(eB))
#µ
γ∗A
γ∗B
¶
=
µ
2β(σ2 − ρ2)
2β(σ2 − ρ2)
¶
.
Cramer’s rule yields
γ∗A =
2β(σ2 − ρ2)
h
(2βσ2 + θ2nA
Nϕ00(eB)) + 2βρ
2
i
(2βσ2 + θ2nB
Nϕ00(eA))(2βσ
2 + θ
2nA
Nϕ00(eB))− (2βρ
2)2
(6)
and γ∗B is obtained from (6) by replacing all subscripts A by B and vice
versa. Note that this condition (6) explicitly determines the optimal shares
only if ϕ00 is constant, as otherwise this is an implicit function, because the
choices of eﬀort depend on the respective shares γ∗i .
Condition (6) reveals that the share of tax revenue that should be redis-
tributed for risk sharing purposes is generally higher if state risks are more
idiosyncratic. For instance, if ρ = σ, the state risks are perfectly correlated
and risk sharing is useless. Accordingly, from (6), γ∗A = γ∗B = 0 in this case.
This reproduces as a by-product the result in Bucovetsky (1997) according
to which federal tax-transfer mechanisms are less attractive as an insurance
whether the agent A who shares in the risks of another agent B is a big single investor, or
whether the agent A consists of many small investors.
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device if regional shocks are more strongly positively correlated. In turn, if
ρ = 0, the condition (6) simplifies to
γ∗i =
2βσ2
2βσ2 + N−ni
N
θ2
ϕ00(ei)
. (7)
For this condition it can be shown that the optimal share of tax revenue that
should take part in the redistribution mechanism increases in β.
The main question we address in this paper is the impact of asymmetry
in population size. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 γ∗A > γ∗B if nA > nB
Proof. The denominators of γ∗A and γ∗B are identical. Hence,
γ∗A > γ∗B if
nA
ϕ00(eB)
>
nB
ϕ00(eA)
. (8)
If ϕ00(e) is constant this implies that γ∗A > γ∗B if nA > nB for any ρ < σ, that
is, if the regions’ risks are imperfectly correlated. However, the result holds
more generally also if ϕ000 > 0. This can be shown by contradiction. Suppose
γ∗A < γ∗B and nA > nB, and hence, γ∗AnB < γ∗BnA, or equivalently
(1− γ∗A
nB
N
) > (1− γ∗B
nA
N
). (9)
By the first-order conditions (5) it follows from inequality (9) that ϕ0(eA) >
ϕ0(eB), and by ϕ00 > 0 we have eA > eB. If ϕ000 ≥ 0 this implies ϕ00(eA) ≥
ϕ00(eB) and hence, by nA > nB, this implies ϕ00(eA)nA > ϕ00(eB)nB, or
nA
ϕ00(eB) >
nB
ϕ00(eA) . This in turn implies γ
∗
A > γ∗B by (8). Hence, we end up
with a contradiction. ¤
Proposition 1 has a simple intuition. In order to find the optimal γi’s that
enter the risk sharing mechanism, we have to consider the trade-oﬀ between
incentives and risk sharing. Suppose, e.g., nA = 99 and nB = 1. If state
A contributes to the redistribution mechanism, it receives back 0.99 units
per unit of tax revenue, whereas B gets back only 0.01 units per unit of tax
revenue. The share that is returned to the state is proportional to relative
population size. Hence, for equal contribution shares, the tax collection
incentives are more strongly distorted in smaller regions. At the same time,
a similarly strong asymmetry as regards risk sharing does not hold. More
precisely, at γA = γB < 1, we can change the γi’s in a way that keeps
the sum of disutilities from risk constant. It turns out that, at γA = γB,
the sum nAβS(gA) + nBβS(gB) stays constant if γA is increased by one
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marginal unit if γB is reduced by precisely the same marginal unit. Hence,
we have a comparative static experiment that keeps the amount of total risk
cost constant and can ask how this aﬀects the other components of overall
utility. By dγA > 0, the region A will further reduce tax collection eﬀort by
deA
dαA = −
θnB
Nϕ00 , whereas regionB will increase its tax collection eﬀort. However,
for given γA = γB, the tax collection eﬀort is more distorted in the region
that has fewer inhabitants by (5). Hence, if the share of tax revenue that
goes into the redistribution mechanism from the smaller region is reduced,
the reduction in distortion is larger than the induced increase in distortion
in the larger region in which the share of tax revenue increases that enters
the redistribution mechanism.
From Proposition 1, we obtain a simple rule for the design of intergovern-
mental transfer mechanisms on a constitutional stage. If the transfer system
is motivated by risk sharing incentives, smaller regions should keep a larger
share in their tax revenues than larger regions. This result is in strong con-
trast to the existing system of intergovernmental transfers. For instance,
in Germany, states are treated symmetrically and the federal redistribution
mechanism does not account for state size as is suggested by Proposition
1. Note that we do not argue for a transfer mechanism that would add to
the existing system. The existing redistribution is considerable, and may or
may not be too high, depending on regions’ risk preferences, the amount of
diversifiable risk, and on the size of distortions from moral hazard that are
generated by given contribution rates. The point made in Proposition 1 is
that, whatever the levels of optimal risk sharing, the optimal contribution
levels are not identical for small and large regions.
The optimal mutual insurance mechanism with asymmetric population
sizes has another interesting property that is stated as
Proposition 2 If the optimal mutual insurance mechanism is implemented
it holds that the larger state has the larger expected tax revenue: e∗A > e
∗
B if
nA > nB.
The proof is by contradiction. Let nA > nB. Suppose e∗A < e
∗
B. This
implies ϕ0(eA) < ϕ0(eB), or, using (5), θ(1−γ∗AnBN ) < θ(1−γ
∗
B
nA
N
). Simplifying
yields γ∗AnB > γ∗BnA. Inserting for γ∗A and γ∗B and simplifying yields
2βnB(σ2 + ρ2) +
θ2nAnB
N
1
ϕ00(e∗B)
> 2βnA(σ2 + ρ2) +
θ2nAnB
N
1
ϕ00(e∗A)
.
By nA > nB, this implies ϕ00(e∗B) < ϕ00(e∗A), and by ϕ000 ≥ 0 we find e∗A > e∗B
which establishes a contradiction. ¤
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Recall that, for identical shares γA and γB, the government in the state
with the larger population size has a stronger incentive to collect revenue,
because the share of an additional unit of revenue that is collected by this
government that will be spent on this region’s population is larger than the
respective share of an additional unit of revenue for the smaller region. The
property of the optimal mechanism that is characterized in Proposition 1
counteracts this incentive: the smaller state optimally contributes a smaller
share to the redistribution mechanism than the larger state, and this reduces
the moral hazard incentives of the small state and increases the moral haz-
ard incentives of the large state, compared to equal shares that average the
optimal shares. However, this process stops in an interior optimum, given
the trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk-sharing, and stops short of where
the two states’ incentives would be equal. Hence, the optimal diﬀerence in
shares is too small to overcome the eﬀect that a smaller region receives back
a smaller share of its contributions to the federal redistribution mechanism.
We briefly discuss an assumption that led to this result. The linear spec-
ification of utility and mean-variance utility is mainly for analytical conve-
nience, and because our empirical analysis is also within a mean-variance
framework. With expected utility, however, income eﬀects matter. For in-
stance, the two regions’ choices of eﬀort are not separable as in (5), and this
adds some complexity to the model. It should be straightforward, however,
that the quintessential property, according to which a smaller region’s tax
collecting incentives are lower than for a large region, should yield qualita-
tively similar results as the ones derived here.
We carried out the analysis here for the case with two regions, the same
design question emerges for federations with more than two states. In general,
and in particular if the correlation between states is not uniform, this problem
is more complex, and the optimal mechanism will sometimes involve making
one state’s transfer payment a function of one other, or a group of other,
states’ observed total tax revenue. To analyse these more complex mechanism
design questions is left to future research. However, we expect that the basic
result in this paper is robust: with a uniform transfer mechanism regions
face a moral hazard incentive that increases if their share in the aggregate
federal revenue becomes smaller, and the federal transfer mechanism should
therefore account for size in order to counterbalance this eﬀect.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we considered the role of the German federal tax-transfer scheme
as a device for revenue-risk sharing between states in Germany. We briefly
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reviewed the empirical literature and the data on whether there is a role for
risk sharing among German states. Piecemeal evidence suggests that there
is a limited number of state-specific long lasting shocks in Germany that
could generate some demand for risk sharing between state governments.
We also saw that one of the properties of fiscal federalism in Germany is
that states diﬀer considerably in size, and that size matters for the states’
incentives to raise revenues in a homogenous and proportional federal tax-
transfer system. We then considered mutual insurance between states in
a federation from a theoretical perspective, asking whether size diﬀerences
matter. We found that size diﬀerences do matter. For the optimal incentive
system a proportional contribution of states to the tax-transfer mechanism
is suboptimal. The small state should contribute a smaller share in their per
capita share of tax revenues than a large state, in order to compensate for
the fact that a given share of contributions to the tax-transfer mechanism
has stronger disincentive eﬀects for a smaller state than for a larger state.
However, the adjustment of contribution shares should not go so far that the
marginal disincentive eﬀects for large and small states should be the same:
in the optimum, the disincentive eﬀect for a small state should indeed be
stronger than for a large state.
For the optimal design of a federal tax-transfer mechanism there are many
aspects that must be taken into account, and some of these reasons may
reinforce, weaken, or even overcompensate the eﬀect derived here. However,
given everything else constant, our analysis provides an eﬃciency reason for
why small states should keep a larger share of their own per capita revenues
than large states so as to optimally balance the benefits of risk sharing and
the harmful disincentive eﬀects.
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